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Abstract. We present an experimental and simulated model of a multi-agent stock market driven by a dou-
ble auction order matching mechanism. Studying the effect of cumulative information on the performance
of traders, we find a non monotonic relationship of net returns of traders as a function of information
levels, both in the experiments and in the simulations. Particularly, averagely informed traders perform
worse than the non informed and only traders with high levels of information (insiders) are able to beat
the market. The simulations and the experiments reproduce many stylized facts of stock markets, such as
fast decay of autocorrelation of returns, volatility clustering and fat-tailed distribution of returns. These
results have an important message for everyday life. They can give a possible explanation why, on average,
professional fund managers perform worse than the market index.
PACS. 89.65.Gh Economics; econophysics, financial markets, business and management – 89.65.-s Social
and economic systems – 89.70.+c Information theory and communication theory – 89.75.-k Complex
systems
1 Introduction
”We live in an information society” is a commonly used
phrase today. Education, knowledge and information are
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considered to be the most important ingredients to success
in business. While we generally agree with this notion, we
think that it does not always hold for financial markets.
70 years ago Cowles [1] was the first to find that the vast
majority of stock market forecasters and fund managers
are not able to beat the market. Subsequent studies by
Jensen [2] and Malkiel [3,4] confirmed this finding. On
average about 70 percent of actively managed stock mar-
ket funds are outperformed by the market, for bonds the
number is even higher at 90 percent. Passive investment
yields on average 1.5 percent per annum more than an
actively managed fund [3]. How can we explain that the
highly paid, professionally trained and, above all, well in-
formed specialists managing these funds are not able to
perform better than the market? The question whether
more information is always good for market participants
is highly relevant not only for fund managers, investment
banks and regulators, but for every individual investor as
well. In this paper we present results from experimental
and simulation studies which allow improving our under-
standing of the relationship between information and in-
vestment success in markets. Our model features several
innovations: First, our model is a multi-period model and
therefore dynamic. It thereby overcomes one of the ma-
jor weaknesses of earlier research relying only on static
environments. Second, we use several information levels
instead of only two used in most of the literature on the
topic (e.g. Refs. [5,6,7,8]). This is critical to go beyond
the straightforward (and not surprising) result that insid-
ers are able to outperform uninformed investors. As we
will see the most interesting cases lie between these ex-
tremes. The averagely informed traders are the ones we
are most interested in, as they exhibit underperformance
in our experiments.
The paper is structured as follows: After the introduc-
tion, Section 2 presents the outline of our experiments,
including the settings, information setup and results. Sec-
tion 3 presents the simulations with sub chapters for the
market mechanism, the information system, and trading
strategies. Results from the simulations are presented in
Section 4, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Outline of Experiments
The experiments we discuss here have been performed by
two of us (Ju¨rgen Huber and Michael Kirchler) at the
University of Innsbruck in 2004 with the participation of
business students. To reduce statistical errors the experi-
ments were repeated seven times with different subjects.
2.1 Settings of the Experiments
The experiments were based on a cumulative information
system. Nine traders with different forecasting abilities
were trading on a continuous double auction with limit
orders and market orders. On the market a risky asset
(stock) and a risk free bond (cash) were traded. Any time,
traders could enter a new limit order to the book or ac-
cept someone’s limit order (realising a market order) with
all trades fixed to unit volume. Each trader had a starting
endowment of 1600 units in cash and 40 shares of stock
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(each worth 40 units in the beginning). The experiment
consisted of 30 periods each lasting 100 trading seconds.
At the end of each period a risk free interest rate was paid
on the cash held by the traders and dividends were paid
based on the shares owned, with parameters set to let one
period correspond to one month in real market. The div-
idend process (D(i)) was a random walk with Gaussian
steps:
D(i) = D(i − 1) + 0.0004N(0, 1) (1)
with D(0) = 0.2, where N(0, 1) is a normal distribution
with zero mean and unit variance. To achieve identical
conditions, the same dividend process was used for all runs
of the experiment.
2.2 Information setup
To value the shares, traders on the market got informa-
tion about future dividends. The idea of Hellwig [6] was
extended to nine information levels: different levels of in-
formation correspond to different lengths of windows in
which one can predict future dividends. Trader I1 knows
the dividend for the end of the current period, trader I2
knows the dividends for the current and the next period,
. . . , trader I9 for the current and the next eight periods
[9,10]. This way we got a cumulative information structure
of the market where better informed agents know future
dividends earlier than less informed ones. Since the mar-
ket session consists of several periods (new information
entering the market in each), the design implies that in-
formation trickles down through the market from the best
informed to the broad public over time.
The information that traders obtain is the present value of
the stock conditioned on the forecasting horizon (E(V |Ij,k)).
This is calculated using Gordon’s formula, discounting the
known dividends and assuming the last one as an infinite
stream which is also discounted. E(V |Ij,k) stands for the
conditional present value of the asset in period k for the
trader with information level j (Ij ).
E(V |Ij,k) =
D(k + j − 1)
re(1 + re)j−2
+
k+j−2∑
i=k
D(i)
(1 + re)i−k
, (2)
where re is the risk adjusted interest rate (E(· · · | · · ·)
denotes the conditional average).
Before the beginning of the experiment an information
level from one to nine (I1,. . . ,I9 ) was randomly assigned
to each trader which he/she kept for the whole session.
There was one trader for each information level and this
was public knowledge. At the beginning of each period
new information was delivered to the traders depending
on their level of information.
2.3 Results of the Experiments
The main interest is in how information affects the per-
formance of traders. The net return of traders compared
to the market return as a function of the information level
can be seen in Fig. 1, the results are the average of the
seven sessions. One can verify that the returns do not
grow monotonically with increasing information. Traders
having the first five levels of information do not outper-
form the average and only the best informed traders (in-
siders) are able to gain excess returns compared to the
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Fig. 1. Results of experiments (average of seven sessions).
Return of traders relative to the market in percentage, as a
function of the information. The returns are a non–monotonic
function of information.
market [9,10]. For a statistical comparison of performance
of traders we ran the Wilcoxon rank sum test for equal
medians [13,14], on the relative performance for pairs of
information levels. The p–values of the tests can be found
in Table 1. Though in many of the cases the result of the
test does not exclude the hypothesis of the returns being
drawn from the same population, one can see that only
the very well informed traders (I8 and I9 ) perform sig-
nificantly better than I3 and I5 on the 0.05 significance
level, and the averagely informed (I5 ) underperform the
least informed (I1 ) at the 0.1 significance level.
Since all information in the experiment is provided for
free and is always correct, the result can not be due to in-
formation cost or wrong information. Furthermore, imple-
menting an information cost in the system would possibly
enlarge the disadvantage of being averagely informed: it
would decrease returns for average and high information
levels most.
Table 1. p–values of the Wilcoxon rank sum test for equal
medians on differences in performance between the information
levels. * significant at the 0.05 level ** significant at the 0.1
level
I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I7 I8
I2 0.710
I3 0.210 0.460
I4 0.800 0.900 0.130
I5 0.070** 0.530 0.530 0.160
I6 1 0.900 0.070** 1 0.210
I7 1 1 0.530 0.620 0.320 0.800
I8 0.530 0.620 0.040* 0.260 0.020* 0.900 1
I9 0.210 0.260 0.010* 0.130 0.010* 0.320 0.320 0.320
A tool for corroborating the relevance of results in ar-
tificial markets to the real-world is analysing from the
point of view of some of the well known empirical styl-
ized facts of markets [11]. While not getting stylized facts
in a simulation can falsify the assumptions made, of course
these facts in themselves do not confirm other results of
the simulation. The probability density function of price
changes, the decay of the autocorrelation function of price
changes and the decay of the autocorrelation function of
absolute price changes were analysed in the experimental
results. For the three tests the results showed similar re-
sults as data from real markets: the distribution of returns
was fat tailed, the autocorrelation of returns decayed fast
and the autocorrelation of absolute returns decayed slowly
(volatility clustering) [12].
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3 The simulations
We carried out computer simulations to numerically re-
produce the results of the experiments done with human
beings. The simulations were run using MatLab program-
ming language.
3.1 The market mechanism
In our simulation we programmed an essential double auc-
tion trading mechanism as it appears on most of real world
financial markets, with a book containing the bid and ask
orders. Since, in contrary to real world experiments, in
a numerical simulation one has the possibility to analyse
truly random traders, we implemented ten agents with dif-
ferent levels of information going from zero–information
(random traders), I0 to I9, and with the possibility of
using different trading strategies as will be discussed in
details in Section 3.2 and Section 3.3. In addition we had
the possibility of running several independent simulations
without having to pay extra money to human participants.
In order to be able to estimate the error of our results we
carried out 100 runs in each simulation.
The simulation setup was very similar to the one in the
experiments: the market contained a risky asset (stock)
and a risk free bond (cash). Before beginning the simula-
tion an information level was assigned to each of the ten
agents (nine informed and one uninformed), thus having
one agent for every level. Initially all agents were endowed
with 1600 units of cash and 40 shares of stock with ini-
tial value of 40 units each. Trading consisted of 30 peri-
ods each lasting 100 simulation steps. At the beginning of
each period new information was delivered to the agents
according to their information level as we will discuss in
Section 3.2. At the end of each period a risk free interest
rate was paid on the cash held by the agents, dividends
were paid on the shares held by the agents (the risk free
interest rate was rf = 0.001, the risk adjusted interest
rate re = 0.005) and the book was cleared. We also car-
ried out simulations without clearing the book and found
that the clearing process does not make much difference
in the results.
The dividend process (being the source of future infor-
mation) was determined before the beginning of the trad-
ing and was held fixed throughout the different runs of
the simulation. Similarly to the experiments, the dividend
process was a random walk of Gaussian steps:
D(i) = D(i − 1) +
0.2
30
N(0, 1). (3)
with D(0) = 0.2, where N(0, 1) is a normal distribution
with zero mean and unit variance. We are carrying out fi-
nite time simulations, so that short trends in the random
walk can have important effects on the dividend process
and by that on the information structure and the price for-
mation on the market. When studying the performance of
heterogeneously informed agents we carried out measure-
ments with different dividend processes in order to see if
we end up with different results. By using different ran-
dom seeds and thus different dividend series we obtained
slight quantitative differences between the solutions, but
the qualitative features of the solutions were very much
alike hence we only show the results for one case.
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3.2 Information
Overall we implemented ten levels of information, a com-
pletely uninformed trader (random trader), I0 and nine
informed traders with different levels of information from
I1 to I9, where agent Ij has information of the dividends
for the end of the current period and of (j−1) forthcoming
periods (forecasting ability). The information received by
traders was the present value of the stock conditional on
the basis of their forecasting ability. This was determined
by Gordon’s formula (Eq. 2).
3.3 Trading strategies
At the beginning of each period agents submit orders ac-
cording to their idea of the value of stocks. After that,
during the period, in every second, one trader is chosen
randomly who either accepts a limit order from the book
(gives a market order) or puts a new limit order to the
book.
Since we do not have exact information on how traders
in real world and in the experiments use their informa-
tion, we gave the possibility to simulated traders to strictly
apply the fundamental information they get (fundamen-
talists), not to take any information in account except
the current price, i.e. trade randomly (random traders)
or to look at other pieces of information such as trends
(chartists). In this paper we show results for the case of
fundamentalist and random traders, these strategies are
described below. The details of the trading strategies and
order placing mechanisms can be found on the web page:
http://www.phy.bme.hu/~bence
3.3.1 Fundamentalists
Fundamentalist traders strictly believe in the information
they receive. If they find an ask order with a price lower
or a bid order with a price higher than their estimated
present value, i.e. E(V |Ij,k), they accept the limit order,
otherwise they put a new limit order between the former
best bid and best ask prices.
3.3.2 Random traders
Random traders put orders randomly. With probability
0.5 they put an ask (bid) order slightly higher (lower)
than the current price.
4 Results
In our simulations we focused on the effect of information
on the performance of agents throughout the market ses-
sion. We also analysed the results from the point of view
of stylized facts of stock markets. In order to reduce sta-
tistical errors we carried out 100 runs of the simulation.
4.1 Final wealth as a function of information
The final return relative to that of the whole market can be
seen in Fig. 2, the results are the average of 100 sessions..
The results are in good accordance with the experimental
results we get a curve we call J–curve. The agents having
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Fig. 2. Results of simulations (average of 100 sessions). Re-
turns of traders relative to the market in percentage, as a func-
tion of information. One can see that having average level of
information is not necessarily an advantage.
average level of information (I1–I5 ) perform worse than
the completely uninformed random agent (I0 ). The best
informed agents outperform the market. (Besides common
sense, the latter can be justified also using mathematics,
since compared to the market index the simulation is a
zero sum game. If the non–informed gets more or less the
market return and the averagely informed are losers, then
the well–informed must get excess gain.). To test the hy-
pothesis of the J–curve we ran the Wilcoxon rank sum test
for equal medians [13,14], on the relative performance for
pairs of information levels. The p–values of the tests can
be found in Table 2. One can see that the hypothesis of
returns for different information levels being drawn from
the same population can be excluded in almost all cases
at the 0.05 significance level. This result and its relevance
to real markets will be discussed further in Section 5.
To understand why the random trader gets almost ex-
actly the market return and to see how the relative wealth
of agents looks like for simpler cases, we ran simulations
Table 2. p–values of the Wilcoxon rank sum test for equal
medians on differences in performance between the information
levels. * significant at the 0.05 level
I0 I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I7 I8
I1 0.000*
I2 0.000* 0.010*
I3 0.000* 0.000* 0.210
I4 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
I5 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
I6 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
I7 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
I8 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
I9 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.210
with only three agents in the market: an uninformed, an
averagely informed (I4 ) and a well informed (I9 ) Fig. 3
shows the plot for this case similarly to Fig. 2. We can ex-
clude the monotonicity of the curve and even if with three
points it is harder to call it a J–curve, we can see that the
random trader performs better than the average informed
one and only the well–informed gets excess returns. In this
case also the random trader performs under the market
level, giving an explanation for the question raised: in case
of enough actors present on the market (10 seems to be
enough), the price impact of the random trader becomes
negligible, thus the random trader has equal probability
of being beaten by the market and of beating the market.
4.2 Stylized facts
We analysed the results of our simulations from the point
of view of the three common empirical stylized facts as
were done for the experiments [12]. Fig 4 shows the auto-
correlation functions of returns (circles and lines) and of
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Fig. 3. Results of simulations (average of 100 sessions). Re-
turns of traders relative to the market in percentage, as a func-
tion of information. Already, in case of 3 agents one can identify
the J–curve.
absolute returns (dots and lines). The noise level of the
computations is also included in the plot (straight lines).
One can see that the autocorrelation of returns decays
fast under the noise level (with a negative overshoot for
small lags as it is usual in real world markets too), thus
there is no long time correlation in price changes. On the
other hand the autocorrelation of absolute returns decays
slowly showing the fact that big price changes tend to clus-
ter (volatility clustering). (A slight even–odd oscillation is
visible in the autocorrelation of absolute returns, this is
an artifact of our simulation process, as there are many
cases in which the intertrade time is two simulation steps,
resulting in this oscillation.)
Figure 5 shows the empirical complementary cumula-
tive distribution function of the absolute returns (dots)
and for comparison the same distribution function for a
series of the same length of normally distributed variables
with the same standard deviation as the series of abso-
lute returns (solid line). It can be seen that the cumula-
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Fig. 4. Autocorrelation functions of returns (circles and lines)
and absolute returns (dots and lines) and the noise level (solid
lines). Autocorrelation of returns decays fast under the noise
level while autocorrelation of absolute returns decays very
slowly, showing the clustering of volatility. Results of one sep-
arate run of the simulations.
tive distribution function of absolute returns has a fatter
tail than the Gaussian as it is well known in real mar-
kets. Running the Jarque–Bera test, for goodness-of-fit to
a normal distribution [15], we can rule out the normality
of the distribution of the absolute returns.
When testing for the stylized facts, we also studied
markets with only random agents trading and we found
similar stylized facts; thus we can state that these empir-
ical facts are effects mainly due to the continuous double
auction trading mechanism as it has been mentioned be-
fore in Ref. [16].
5 Conclusions
In this paper we presented a model of an experimental and
a simulated double auction stock market with cumulative
information delivered to traders. We focused on the value
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Fig. 5. The empirical complementary cumulative distribution
function of the absolute returns (dots) and for comparison the
same distribution function for a series of the same length of
normally distributed variables with the same standard devia-
tion as the series of absolute returns (solid line). One can see
that the distribution of absolute returns is a fatter tail distri-
bution than the Gaussian. Result of one separate run of the
simulations.
of information for the traders, in case of several informa-
tion levels.
The results of the experiments and the simulation show
a non trivial, non monotonic dependence of agents’ re-
turns on the amount of information possessed. We found,
that averagely informed traders perform worse than the
market level. In the simulations we analysed the case of
non informed traders and found that if there are enough
traders present on the market, the non informed, random
trader is able to get the market return. Hence we can
state that averagely informed traders perform worse than
the completely non informed, thus in case of the averagely
informed traders the information has a negative effect on
the performance. Only the most informed traders (insid-
ers) are able to gain above–average returns.
These results can give a possible explanation for a puz-
zling real life phenomenon. Most of the professional fund
managers on stock markets perform worse on the long
run than the market itself, i.e. they get lower returns than
a random trader would get in the same period, see e.g.
Ref. [4]. The possible cause for this bad performance can
be seen from our results: most of the professional fund
managers are not insiders neither completely uninformed.
They fit into the middle of our curve on Fig. 2. Traders
taking random decisions can outperform them on the long
run, receiving the market return. The reason for this phe-
nomenon can be interpreted in the following way: traders
having no forecasting ability trade randomly and can not
be exploited by other traders. At the same time, traders
having average forecasting horizon but believing in the
information they possess, can be exploited by better in-
formed traders, insiders. Of course the behaviour of real
world traders is much more complicated than the ones im-
plemented in our simulations, e.g. they have the possibility
of modifying strategy, switching between stocks or sectors
whereas in our experimental and simulation platform only
one stock was present. Nevertheless the non-monotonic be-
haviour of Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 suggests an explanation for
the low average performance of actively managed funds.
It is important to stress, that while heterogeneous be-
liefs of agents are necessary for trading (if all agents had
the same expectations, no one would find it attractive to
trade), we were able to reproduce the J–curve of the ex-
periments in our simulations by implementing fundamen-
talist strategy. Thus it is enough to assume that traders
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use the information they possess to get the non mono-
tonic relationship of net returns of traders as a function
of information levels.
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